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CLEANING UP SPACE: THE MADRID PROTOCOL TO THE
ANTARCTIC TREATY AS A MODEL FOR REGULATING
ORBITAL DEBRIS
MARY BUTTON*
INTRODUCTION
Space . . . is big. Really big. You just won’t believe how
vastly, hugely, mindbogglingly big it is. I mean, you may
think it’s a long way down the road to the chemist’s, but
that’s just peanuts to space.1
When they consider space at all, most people think of it as a vast
other, something huge beyond Earth and beyond our environment. Huge
though it may be, space is not separate from us and it is not outside of our
influence. The space near Earth, the orbit, is different from any other place
in the universe due to its proximity to our planet and the impact humans
have on the area. Humanity needs to stop thinking of the planet’s orbit
as just a part of the vastness of space, and remember that it is, in fact,
part of the environment—part of our environment.
Earth’s orbit is a vital component of the overall environmental
system of the planet, and it has become heavily polluted by debris.2 The
debris pollution in the orbit is a worsening problem, which is not ade-
quately addressed by any extant regulations. To clean up this environmen-
tal disaster, the international community must shift its focus regarding
the orbit from national and commercial interests to environmental con-
siderations and adopt an enforceable environmental protocol. The best
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1 DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 69 (2007).
2 Natalie Pusey, Note, The Case for Preserving Nothing: The Need for a Global Response
to the Space Debris Problem, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 425 (2010) (“Like so many
of Earth’s delicate regions, Earth orbit has been greatly altered by human activity. For
a variety of reasons, human exploration and the commercialization of space create litter,
or debris, that pollutes Earth orbit.”).
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option for doing so is to create a new international treaty and governing
body modeled largely on the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty (“PEPAT”).3
In Part I.A, this Note explains what Earth’s orbit is and how it in-
teracts with the terrestrial environment. It then discusses why it should
be treated as a part of the environment and as a limited resource that
must be carefully preserved and regulated. Looking at Earth’s orbit as an
environmental system, Part I.B.1 lays out the problem of orbital debris:
what it is and what environmental problems it causes, including nuclear
contamination of orbit and Earth, astronomical blinding, and that such
debris is pollution in and of itself.
Part I.B.2 looks at orbital debris as a current and growing prob-
lem, as demonstrated by recent collisions between satellites and other
events in the past decade that have created massive amounts of new
debris. After outlining the present state of the debris field, and current
predictions on how it will grow in the future, Part II addresses the cur-
rent regulation of this debris. As it stands today, orbital debris is not well-
regulated. Part II establishes that this is because the current regulations
are non-binding and are not enforced in a practical way.4 Even if they were
binding and enforced, they would still be ineffective, because none of the
existing regulations have provisions for cleaning up orbital debris.5 Further-
more, some of the provisions in these regulations could actually act as road-
blocks to removing debris from orbit. Finally, current regulations focus on
the oversight of state actors,6 even though private companies have an ever-
increasing presence in space.7
Having established the existing problems, I propose a solution in
Part III: a new regulation of orbit modeled on PEPAT. This Part briefly out-
lines the provisions of PEPAT, and then gives a breakdown of how PEPAT
can be applied to orbit. This includes: which provisions would be effective,
which should be dropped, and how parts of PEPAT can be adapted so that
they either protect orbit specifically, or are more effective in general.
3 Although others have suggested importing aspects of the underlying structure of PEPAT,
the Antarctic Treaty System, into orbit, this Note focuses specifically on how the PEPAT
agreement could be a useful model for orbital regulations, rather than discussing the
Antarctic Treaty as a whole.
4 See Pusey, supra note 2, at 435.
5 Brian Beck, The Next, Small, Step for Mankind: Fixing the Inadequacies of the Inter-
national Space Law Treaty Regime to Accommodate the Modern Space Flight Industry,
19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 27 (2009).
6 Id. at 7.
7 Id. at 13.
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I. THE ORBITAL ENVIRONMENT AND DEBRIS
A. What Is the Orbital Environment?
The environment discussed in this Note is not all of outer space,
but is limited to the orbital area immediately surrounding Earth, which
is commonly used for satellites.8 There is no international consensus on
where the atmosphere ends and space begins.9 For the purposes of this
Note, the definition of 100km above Earth’s surface and upwards will be
used, which is based on the lowest point at which an object can orbit Earth
without propulsion systems.10 The fact that there is confusion on this point
demonstrates that the difference between Earth’s atmosphere and the orbit
is blurry, perhaps even entirely arbitrary. It is all part of the same inter-
related environmental system, without a clear dividing line.11
Outer space as a whole should be viewed through the lens of envi-
ronmental policy concerns, but Earth’s orbit is of particular interest because
it directly affects terrestrial environmental systems.12 In addition, human-
ity is hardly cluttering up the rest of the solar system at this point, but
Earth’s orbit is a part of the space environment within our reach, and we
are making a mess of it.
1. Orbit as a Limited Resource
Space is, as suggested by Douglas Adams, absolutely huge—which
is why it can be so easy to forget that Earth’s orbit is, in fact, a finite region
of space. There are three primary levels of orbit used for satellites: Low
Earth Orbit (“LEO”), Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (“GEO”), and Medium
Earth Orbit (“MEO”).13 Of these, GEO is the most highly sought after real
8 MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, ORBITAL DEBRIS: TECHNICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 7
(2006) (“For a variety of reasons, satellites tend to congregate in certain well-defined regions
around the Earth. The mission of the satellite is probably the most important factor in
determining the orbit. However, mass and fuel limitations, radiation levels, and orbital
mechanics also play important roles. These factors have important consequences for the
issue of orbital debris because the most useful orbits have also become the most congested.”).
9 See G.C.M. REIJNEN & W. DE GRAAFF, THE POLLUTION OF OUTER SPACE, IN PARTICULAR
OF THE GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT 2 (1989).
10 Id. at 3.
11 David Enrico Reibel, Environmental Regulation of Space Activity: The Case of Orbital
Debris, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 97 (1991) (emphasizing the importance of considering space
as a part of Earth’s environment).
12 See infra Part I.B.1.
13 TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 7–10.
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estate, because “the [GEO] is composed of a set of vantage points around
the Earth’s equator from which satellites have the ‘best seat’ to communi-
cate with the planet below.”14 The majority of satellites engaged in com-
mercial communications are in GEO.15
GEO slots are currently regulated by the International Telecom-
munication Union (“ITU”).16 This began as a natural outgrowth from the
organization’s traditional duty of apportioning radio frequencies.17 It now
also distributes GEO slots to avoid both satellite collisions and satellite
signal interference.18 “The ITU does not have an environmental mission,
but because overcrowding in GEO has a detrimental effect on telecommu-
nications, it has promulgated provisions to address the creation of debris
in GEO.”19
There have been political efforts from developing countries to
change the way GEO positions are determined, including a failed attempt
by the infamous “Bogotá Eight” to claim GEO slots directly above their
own nations as part of their sovereign territory.20 In addition, the ITU sys-
tem has been abused by some countries. In 1991, Tonga tried to obtain six
slots in GEO, not so it could use them, but so it could rent or sell them by
auction to other parties wanting to launch satellites into GEO.21 Under in-
ternational pressure, some of these slots were returned by Tonga, and the
ITU now requires “that a majority of slots applied for be used directly by
the requesting country.”22 These slots are valuable; they are worth enough
money that countries squabble over and plot to get more of them because
of their potential scarcity.23 GEO is the best example of the true nature of
orbit; it is not merely part of the mind-boggling hugeness of space, it is a
limited resource intimately connected with Earth. There are only so many
satellites that can fit around our planet.
14 Nima Nayebi, The Geosynchronous Orbit and the Outer Limits of Westphalian Sovereignty,
3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 471, 472 (2011).
15 Satellite Quick Facts, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets
/documents/nwgs/quick-facts-and-analysis-4-13-09.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
16 Timothy G. Nelson, The Moon Agreement and Private Enterprise: Lessons from Investment
Law, 17 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 408 (2011).
17 Id.
18 See id.
19 Pusey, supra note 2, at 428. These regulations include recommending that GEO satellites
be moved into a “graveyard” orbit out of GEO before they become inoperable, to avoid over-
crowding GEO with inoperable satellites. Id.
20 Nayebi, supra note 14, at 487; see also infra Part II.B.2.
21 Nelson, supra note 16, at 408.
22 Id. at 409.
23 See id. at 408.
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B. Orbital Debris: What It Is, Why It Is a Problem
Before the twentieth century, the near space surrounding Earth was
a pristine environment.24 Today, Earth is surrounded by an ever-growing
cloud of garbage, and its orbit is heavily polluted by the mass of debris.25
Pollution in orbit takes the form of orbital debris and the overcrowding
of satellites.26 “Orbital” or “space” debris is debris left over from objects
launched into space,27 and includes everything from derelict satellites to
lost screwdrivers, and even golf balls.28 Orbital debris is an ever-increasing
problem, because as debris moves in orbit, pieces of it collide and break
apart, creating more debris.29 While there are several agencies worldwide
with varying abilities in tracking space debris, “thus far, only the United
States and Russia have systems that do systematic observation, as op-
posed to spot checks.”30 The United States Strategic Command tracks over
22,000 man-made orbiting objects, including satellites and debris.31
One of the primary sources of orbital debris is exploding rocket
engines.32 “Originally, these engines were jettisoned in orbit after launch,
24 See Jonathan Amos, Space Debris: Time to Clean Up the Sky, BBC NEWS (Sept. 2, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-14763668.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., NASA PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LIMITING
ORBITAL DEBRIS (W/CHANGE 1—5/14/09) (2009), available at http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov
/displayDir.cfm?t=NPR&c=8715&s=6A (“Orbital debris is defined as any object placed in
space . . . by humans that remains in orbit and no longer serves any useful function or
purpose. Objects range from spacecraft to spent launch vehicle stages to components and
also include materials, trash, refuse, fragments, or other objects which are overtly or
inadvertently cast off or generated.”); see also INT’L ACAD. OF ASTRONAUTICS, POSITION
PAPER ON SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION (2005), available at http://iaaweb.org/iaa/Studies
/spacedebrismitigation.pdf (defining orbital/space debris as “all man[-]made objects in-
cluding fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere, that
are non[-]functional.”).
28 Kelly Young, Space Golf Shot Might Stay in Orbit for Years, NEW SCIENTIST (Nov. 17,
2006), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn10606-space-golf-shot-might-stay-in-orbit
-for-years.html; see also TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 1, 15.
29 See Reibel, supra note 11, at 108; see also infra Part I.B.2.
30 Pusey, supra note 2, at 433; see also MARK WILLIAMSON, SPACE: THE FRAGILE FRONTIER
54 (2006).
31 USSTRATCOM Space Control and Space Surveillance, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, http://
www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/USSTRATCOM_Space_Control_and_Space_Surveillance/
(last updated May 2012).
32 DAVE BAIOCCHI & WILLIAM WELSER IV, NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH INST., CONFRONTING SPACE
DEBRIS: STRATEGIES AND WARNINGS FROM COMPARABLE EXAMPLES INCLUDING DEEPWATER
HORIZON 2, 17 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs
/2010/RAND_MG1042.pdf.
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and the remaining fuel expanded because of the thermal conditions. Under
the right conditions, the pressure became too great, and the rocket body
exploded.”33 Exploding rocket engines have become less of a problem since
the 1990s, when they were redesigned to vent pressure through valves.34
However, the already exploded rocket bodies continue to collide, and were
the primary source of orbital debris through 2007.35
One need only read the news to see that orbital debris is a current
and worsening problem.36 Some of the worst instances of collisions involv-
ing or creating orbital debris have happened relatively recently.37 There
had never been a collision between two catalogued pieces of orbital debris
until 1991.38 In 1996, the first publicly documented collision involving two
internationally catalogued space objects took place between a French mili-
tary microsatellite and a European Space Association rocket body.39 This
collision resulted in debris breaking off from both objects, only one piece of
which was large enough to be tracked.40 This event is an example of the
self-generating nature of debris. Collisions between debris and function-
ing satellites, apart from the monetary harm they may cause to the owners
of satellites, cause environmental damage. Once damaged in a collision, a
satellite can lose its ability to correct its orbit, and become another hazard
in space, without any way to steer onto a better orbital path.41 This greatly
increases the chance of a damaged satellite careening into some other
orbiting object, be it another satellite or a piece of debris, and continuing
the cycle of debris generation.
There have been a number of collisions involving already existing
debris. There was a debris-on-debris collision between tracked trash from
the United States and China in January of 2005.42 This, like the collisions
33 Id. at 2.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 E.g., Amos, supra note 24.
37 BAIOCCHI & WELSER, supra note 32, at 2.
38 See id. at 26–27 (“In 1991, a non-functional Russian navigation satellite in LEO collided
with a piece of debris that had previously detached from another Russian satellite. The
impact created many new pieces of debris.”). While this collision occurred in 1991, it was
not identified until 2005. Id. at 27 n.136.
39 Henry T. Scott, Improving the Shield: Mitigating the Danger of Space Debris by Enforc-
ing and Developing Already Existing Space Law, 34 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE LAW 719,
720 (2009).
40 Id.
41 See Concern Over Space Debris, THE BRUNEI TIMES (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.bt.com
.bn/editorial/2011/09/28/concern-over-space-debris.
42 TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 27.
2013] CLEANING UP SPACE: THE MADRID PROTOCOL 545
between satellites and debris, contributes to the self-sustaining cloud of
space trash as the pieces break apart and cause more hazards.
1. Orbital Debris as an Environmental Problem
Orbital debris is garbage and a pollutant in and of itself. It is im-
portant not to lose track of that basic consideration; beyond any potential
damage to Earth’s surface, beyond any financial losses, orbital debris is,
essentially, litter.43 There are specific harms relating to this debris, how-
ever, that may drive the environmental damage it causes home.
a. Potential Nuclear Contamination of Earth’s Surface
The man-made objects in orbit have the potential to harm terrestrial
environmental systems, particularly when one considers the risks from
nuclear waste in space. This danger was made apparent in 1978, when
a Soviet satellite malfunctioned and fell to Earth, scattering radioactive
debris over northern Canada.44 Only about 0.1 percent of the satellite’s
power source was ever recovered.45 There have been international efforts
to limit the use of nuclear materials in orbit, the most significant of which
is the Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources In Outer
Space, established by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs
(“UNOOSA”).46 These principles call for limitations on the use of nuclear
materials in space, only allowing nuclear fuel for “those space missions
which cannot be operated by non-nuclear energy sources in a reasonable
way.”47 The protocol specifically protects both the terrestrial environment
and the space environment.48 However, the regulation is non-binding,49
severely limiting its usefulness.
43 Pusey, supra note 2, at 425.
44 COMM. FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF NASA’S ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAMS, NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, LIMITING FUTURE COLLISION RISK TO SPACECRAFT: AN ASSESSMENT OF NASA’S
METEOROID AND ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAMS 61 (2011), available at http://www.nap.edu
/catalog.php?record_id=13244 [hereinafter ASSESSMENT]; see also infra Part II.A.2.a for a
discussion of the legal fallout from this incident.
45 See ASSESSMENT, supra note 44.
46 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, G.A. Res. 47/68,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/68 (Feb. 23, 1993), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc
.asp?symbol=A/RES/47/68&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION.
47 Id. at Principle 3.
48 Id.
49 J-A. van Wyk, Overview of the Implementation Status of the Five United Nations Treaties
on Outer Space in African Countries, 12 AFRICAN SKIES/CIEUX AFRICAINS 90, 91 (2008),
available at http://www.saao.ac.za/~wgssa/archive/as12/van_wyk.pdf.
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b. Astronomical Blinding
Visual pollution is one effect of orbital debris which impacts the
environment in a way that human beings can see from Earth, and there-
fore perhaps better appreciate. Space debris can interfere with satellite
observations of outer space and it “can also obscure ground-based astro-
nomical observation.”50 This means that debris in orbit is diminishing
humanity’s view of the stars in the same way as atmospheric pollution
and light pollution.
Aside from the aesthetic loss, the debris also harms scientific re-
search; orbital debris “can either decrease the quality of, or completely
negate, many hours of observations.”51 Orbital debris has become a physi-
cal and visual barrier between Earth and the rest of the universe. This is
pollution on a massive scale, and the problem is only getting worse.
2. Current and Future State of Orbital Debris
Since 2007, the greatest contributors to orbital debris were two
major collisions. The first was an attempt by the Chinese government to
destroy one of its old satellites with an anti-satellite missile in 2007.52 The
attempt, far from successfully removing the satellite from orbit, massively
increased the amount of debris by adding “2,606 [sic.] trackable objects to
the U.S. space catalog as of June 2010” and an estimated “35,000–500,000
smaller, untrackable pieces of debris.”53 The methods used by China did not
conform with any international agreements on the removal of satellites.54
The second collision event took place in 2009, when “an active
Iridium communications satellite” collided with a non-functioning Russian
communication satellite, creating 1658 pieces of trackable orbital debris.55
As the number of defunct satellites and the amount of debris in orbit in-
creases, these kinds of collisions will also be on the rise, creating a cycle
of increasing orbital debris.56 In discussing orbital debris, environmental
issues and the potential problem of debris colliding with active operations
in space are one and the same; any danger to satellites from orbital debris
means the potential creation of even more orbital debris, and therefore,
more pollution.
50 Pusey, supra note 2, at 431.
51 TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 33.
52 BAIOCCHI & WELSER, supra note 32, at 2.
53 Id.
54 Scott, supra note 39, at 758.
55 BAIOCCHI & WELSER, supra note 32, at 2.
56 Reibel, supra note 11, at 108.
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Unfortunately, without an international system in place for debris
removal, more nations may follow China’s lead in attempting debris and
satellite removal unilaterally. There are no binding international agree-
ments on how satellites are to be retired,57 which means that there is
nothing stopping another disastrous attempt from being tried by another
government. This event created more orbital debris than any other single
event,58 and yet there is no system in place to keep history from repeat-
ing itself.
According to Henry Scott’s article on orbital debris, “[a]n increase
in the quantity of space debris, even in the absence of new launches and
with complete international compliance with all existing debris mitigation
guidelines, is inevitable.”59 In fact, a 2006 report by NASA scientists found
that beyond 2055, the debris population in LEO will increase dramatically,
largely due to debris-on-debris collisions,60 such as the collision between
the U.S. and Russian satellites in 2009, and the Chinese missile launch in
2007. The pollution that exists right now will have environmental reper-
cussions stretching well into the future, including an inevitable increase in
the amount of debris forty-some years from now. This pollution has become
a gift for our grandchildren, and one that we cannot take back. One scholar
stated that “[o]rbital debris in GEO is estimated to last anywhere from a
million to 10 million years.”61 This means that we cannot wait for debris
in the GEO to come back to Earth through natural orbital degradation, it
must be actively removed at some point, or it will continue to pollute the
GEO and endanger satellites, potentially creating more debris for millions
of years.
The NASA study points to two things: first, action must be taken
as soon as possible, to avoid an even greater environmental disaster than
already predicted.62 Second, it suggests the urgency of creating a new plan;
current regulations, if followed, will not stop the increase of debris, so alter-
natives must be explored to try and avoid the looming threat.63 The scien-
tific and international community has not yet agreed upon a plan to remove
57 See Scott, supra note 39, at 758.
58 John Matson, U.S. Taking Initial Steps to Grapple with Space Debris Problem, SCI. AM.
(Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=orbital-debris-space-fence.
59 Scott, supra note 39, at 727 (emphasis in original).
60 J.-C. Liou & N. L. Johnson, Risks in Space from Orbiting Debris, 311 SCIENCE 340 (2006),
available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/311/5759/340.full.pdf.
61 TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 10.
62 Liou & Johnson, supra note 60, at 340.
63 Id.
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debris that is technologically viable;64 but current regulations prevent
any future technological advance in debris removal from being effectively
implemented.65 Therefore, orbit regulation needs to change in order to cre-
ate an environment in which mitigation and removal of orbital debris is
politically and legally possible.
II. POLLUTION IN ORBIT IS POORLY REGULATED
A. International Regulations
In studying the regulation of outer space, one must remember that
“space law, as it now exists, is not an independent legal system. It is merely
a functional classification of those rules of international law and of munic-
ipal law.”66 There are several international regulations that govern the use
of space.67 However, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, more commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty
of 1967 (“OST”),68 the Convention for International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects of 1972 (“ILD”),69 and the Convention on Regis-
tration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (“Registration Convention”)
are the most directly applicable to orbital debris.70 As will be discussed
with regard to individual treaties, all of these regulations have flaws which
prevent the environment of Earth’s orbit from being protected or “cleaned
up” effectively.71 None of these regulations create both a duty to remove
64 TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 79 (“Currently, there are no economically or technically feasible
ways to remove debris from space.”).
65 See infra Part II.
66 BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 383 (1997).
67 For a list of the U.N.-developed multilateral treaties, see U.N., UNITED NATIONS TREATIES
AND PRINCIPLES ON OUTER SPACE (2002), available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications
/STSPACE11E.pdf.
68 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
610 U.N.T.S. 205, available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf
[hereinafter OST].
69 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972,
24.2 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications
/STSPACE11E.pdf [hereinafter ILD].
70 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 1023
U.N.T.S. 15, available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf [herein-
after Registration Convention].
71 TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 79–80.
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orbital debris and an effective policy for how to do so. In addition, these
guidelines are non-binding and thus essentially unenforced.72 Finally, none
of these guidelines effectively consider regulation of non-governmental
parties.73 Current regulations are state-centric, which does not work well
with the modern trend towards private enterprise in space.74
1. The OST
The OST is not an environmentally minded treaty. Its focus is
on the exploration of space “for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries,”75 the “use of outer space for peaceful purposes,”76 and “free-
dom of scientific investigation in outer space.”77 The word “environment”
is used only once, and only in reference to Earth’s environment; signing
nations are expected to conduct studies in such a way as to avoid “adverse
changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of
extraterrestrial matter.”78 Parties to the treaty are also expected to avoid
“potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties.”79
Even though the OST does not actively consider the orbital environ-
ment, it does have a theoretical impact on orbital debris. The OST declares
that state parties are internationally responsible for the activities in space
carried out by “governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities,”80
and that both the launching State and the State from which a space object
is launched are liable for any damage caused by the object or its component
parts to another State Party “on the Earth, in air space or in outer space.”81
It further declares that objects launched into outer space, and their com-
ponent parts, belong at all times to the State on whose registry the object
is carried.82 Finally, parties who believe that some aspect of their activities
in space might cause harm to another party or to the “peaceful exploration
and use of outer space” must “undertake appropriate international con-
sultations before proceeding.”83
72 See Pusey, supra note 2, at 435.
73 See Beck, supra note 5, at 12–15.
74 See id. at 12.
75 OST, supra note 68, art. I.
76 Id. Preamble.
77 Id. art. I.
78 Id. art. IX.
79 Id.
80 Id. art. VI.
81 OST, supra note 68, art. VII.
82 Id. art. VIII.
83 Id. art. IX.
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a. Why the OST Regulations Are Ineffective for Solving the
Orbital Debris Problem
In spite of the OST’s utter lack of concern for outer space as a part
of the environment, the treaty still addresses major concerns of orbital
debris regulation: who is responsible for orbital debris and how to prevent
the creation of more orbital debris. However, the OST does not address
these concerns in a manner that is in any way practicable. Declaring that
the launching state and the state from which the object launches are ulti-
mately liable sounds sufficient, but in reality, it is largely unenforceable.
If the collision is between two satellites, for instance, these provisions can
be useful. For example, in February 2009 a Russian satellite collided with
an American satellite.84 Scientists determined that neither nation was at
fault,85 so the OST was not invoked. If it had been invoked, however, at the
very least what nations were involved in determining fault would have
been obvious—Russia and the United States. But that collision also cre-
ated over 1600 pieces of orbital debris.86 Which pieces of debris came from
which satellite? How could a ragged bit of Russian metal hurtling through
orbit be differentiated from a ragged bit of American metal? What if some
of the debris resulting from this collision next collides with and damages
a French communications satellite? The idea that each State will “own” or
“be liable for” the component parts of each launched object is laughable—
debris cannot always be traced back to a specific launched object. Further-
more, even if neither country was at fault, these regulations do not address
who may complain for the damage done to the orbital environment itself,
as opposed to a satellite, since environmental damage is only addressed
regarding the terrestrial environment.
Additionally, the OST does not take into account the current state
of orbital use. When it was written, orbit was the domain of State actors.87
As time has passed, however, the presence of private companies in space
has only increased.88 Private corporations have owned satellites for years,89
84 Pusey, supra note 2, at 430; see also supra Part I.B.2.
85 William Harwood, U.S. and Russian Satellites Collide, CBS NEWS (Feb. 12, 2009,
4:33 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/11/tech/main4792976.shtml.
86 BAIOCCHI & WELSER, supra note 32, at 2.
87 See Beck, supra note 5, at 7.
88 Frank J. Balsamello, Note, When You Wish Upon a Falling Billboard: Advertising in an
Age of Space Tourism, 98 GEO. L.J. 1769, 1776 (2010).
89 Satellite Timeline, SOC’Y OF SATELLITE PROF’LS INT’L, http://www.sathistory.com/ (last
visited Jan. 29, 2013) (showing a timeline of satellite activity, including the growth of pri-
vate satellite ownership).
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and in 2004 the X-Prize, a non-profit foundation, paid out a $10 million
prize for the first private spacecraft to travel into sub-orbit twice within
the same week.90 Currently, Virgin Galactic is attempting to become the
first private company to offer flights into space.91 As private companies be-
come more and more involved in space, the need to directly regulate their
orbital activities increases.92 But the OST only regulates these companies
through State parties and does not allow private corporations as parties
to the treaty;93 this is a fundamental weakness.
Beyond being ineffective, this treaty might actually hinder efforts
to remove orbital debris. The OST definition of ownership means that a
State launching something into orbit retains property rights in perpetuity,
down to the component parts.94 This stance did not create a good back-
ground for reducing orbital debris because it did not have an ending point
for ownership. Presumably, a party may want to retain ownership over a
slightly damaged satellite that can be salvaged in some way, but how dam-
aged can a satellite be and still retain its property status? At what point
might a satellite be considered “abandoned” and therefore something that
a third party could dispose of for the common good? Following the logic of
the OST, that point can never be reached.
As for mitigating the creation of orbital debris, a similar problem
exists. The treaty could be interpreted as offering a solution, mandating
that States concerned that their activities will harm other parties or the
peaceful exploration of space must consult the international community.95
Orbital debris should fit the bill for this requirement; it is a dangerous ele-
ment for all parties with activities in space, and it clearly interferes with
space exploration and scientific study.96 Therefore, following the language
of the OST, each nation that launches a satellite should be consulting with
other nations to figure out the best way to avoid creating more orbital
debris, for instance, with proper placement of the satellite or by making
sure there is a plan for removing the satellite from orbit once it ceases to
function. The OST’s potential plan has clearly failed; the OST was signed
90 Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the Earth to the
Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 23, 24–25 (2005).
91 Virgin Galactic Announced, VIRGIN GALACTIC (Sept. 27, 2004), http://www.virgingalactic
.com/news/item/virgin-galactic-announced/.
92 See generally TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 42 (explaining the importance of regulating the
liability of non-governmental entities in space).
93 OST, supra note 68, art. VI.
94 Id. art. VIII.
95 Id. art. IX.
96 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 32; see also supra Part I.B.
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in 1967, and the amount of debris in orbit has only increased in the decades
since its signing.97
2. The ILD and the Registration Convention
The ILD attempts to set up the rules for liability for damage caused
by space objects,98 while the Registration Convention established how the
identity of the responsible party for each space object is to be tracked.99
These conventions, while not effective on the whole, do take a step in the
right direction in that they recognize non-governmental organizations who
accept its tenets as parties under the convention, unlike the OST.100
a. Why the ILD and Registration Convention Are Ineffective for
Solving the Orbital Debris Problem
Unfortunately, property rights in space became an even greater
problem for removing debris from orbit with the signing of the ILD and
Registration Convention. The ILD asks parties to determine who owns any
“space object” before taking action on it, and the drafters define “space
object” as “component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle
and parts thereof.”101 This is a broad definition, which appears to encom-
pass any sort of orbital debris.
Orbital debris have been produced by many different countries.102
As Michael Taylor put it, “[t]o have any noticeable effect on the quantity
of debris, a group of States undertaking such an endeavor would need to
be able to remove any debris, not just debris for which that group of States
was a launching State.”103 This means that when the technology to success-
fully remove orbital debris becomes available, under current regulations it
cannot be used by any organization to clean up orbit without determining
the ownership of each and every piece, according to the commonly accepted
reading of this convention.104
97 See Amos, supra note 24.
98 ILD, supra note 69, art. II.
99 Registration Convention, supra note 70, arts. I–IV.
100 ILD, supra note 69, art. XXII; see also Registration Convention, supra note 70, art. VII.
101 ILD, supra note 69, art. I.
102 Matson, supra note 58 (“[O]f the catalogued debris now in orbit, 37 percent is Russian
or Soviet in origin, 29 percent is American and 28 percent is Chinese.”).
103 TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 79–80.
104 Id. at 80.
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The National Research Council’s recent report on NASA’s orbital
debris program set out the difficulty that the current treaty system creates
regarding the removal of orbital debris, stating that it would involve “cross-
ing a crucial national and international legal threshold.”105 Thanks to the
extant treaty system, the report notes that “[n]o state has the legal author-
ity to remove a debris object from space without the express consent of the
object’s state of registry.”106 This means that any state wishing to imple-
ment large-scale debris removal would have to engage in formal diplomacy
to gain the consent of the nation who owns the registry of a given piece of
debris.107 The ILD and the Registration Convention, far from helping to
clean up orbit, have made the work of reducing orbital pollution even more
difficult. The ILD has been ratified by eighty-eight states and signed by an
additional twenty-three states.108
Beyond this, the ILD declares that launching states alone are liable
for damage caused by objects launched into space.109 For damage on Earth
or to an aircraft, the liability is absolute, while if damage is to another
state’s space object, the launching state is only liable if it was at fault.110
Meanwhile, the Registration Convention requires all launching states to
maintain a registry of space objects it launches, which is then passed along
to the United Nations so the object can be registered there as well.111 For
multistate launches, the parties must decide amongst themselves who is
to carry the registry and be responsible for the space object.112 This
means that the same problems noted under the OST113 persist with these
regulations—private companies are not directly liable for their actions
in space, even though private space activity is on the rise.114
The liability system has been successfully implemented—for dam-
age done on Earth. As mentioned earlier, in 1978, a Soviet satellite crash-
landed in Canada.115 Canada brought suit against the Soviet Union under
105 ASSESSMENT, supra note 44, at 83–84.
106 Id. at 84.
107 See id.
108 Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, U.N. OFFICE
FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treatystatus
/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
109 ILD, supra note 69, arts. II–III. For a general discussion on the roadblocks created by
the ILD liability situation, see TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 90.
110 ILD, supra note 69, arts. II–III.
111 Registration Convention, supra note 70, arts. II(1), III.
112 Id. art. II(2).
113 See supra Part II.A.1.a.
114 Balsamello, supra note 88, at 1775.
115 ASSESSMENT, supra note 44, at 61.
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the ILD, and in 1981 the U.S.S.R. settled, paying the Canadian government
$3 million.116 The ILD system was effective in this case. However, this suc-
cess is because this was a case involving terrestrial damage. The ILD estab-
lishes absolute liability for damage caused on Earth.117 Unfortunately, for
damage caused in orbit, the ILD uses a fault-based system of liability.118
The ILD and the Registration Convention attempt to set up a
framework in which states can enforce a safe orbital environment by suing
countries that are “at fault,” but the system is untenable. David Tan sum-
marized the problems nicely: “[t]he specificity of damage, the requirement
of fault, and the difficulty of identification all contribute to the impotence
of the Liability Convention and the Registration Convention in the pro-
tection of the outer-space environment from debris pollution.”119 There are
simply too many pieces that need to come together to enforce these con-
ventions with regards to orbital debris. According to the Space Frontier
Foundation, “only the United States routinely registers all stages of a
launch; most countries merely register the launch vehicle and the pay-
load(s). Most important, there is no penalty for not registering with the
U.N.”120 The only solution offered by the Registration Convention for un-
identified space debris is that the State Party that is concerned can request
assistance and other State Parties to the Convention are to assist in identi-
fying it.121 It is hard to imagine that this system will be practical in any way
if a nation’s satellite is damaged by orbital debris from an unknown source.
This is not a reasonable solution to the problem of orbital debris.
This is not even a reasonable solution for how liability systems should
work in orbit. After all, how does one determine “fault” in orbit? Unless
dealing with GEO slots, which are determined by the ITU,122 orbit is some-
thing of a free-for-all, so there are no reliable standards for where a space
object should be located to avoid fault in the case of a collision.123
116 Id.
117 ILD, supra note 69, art. II.
118 Id. art. III.
119 David Tan, Towards a New Regime for the Protection of Outer Space as the “Province
of All Mankind,” 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 145, 168 (2000).
120 JAMES DUNSTAN & BOB WERB, SPACE FRONTIER FOUND., LEGAL AND ECONOMICS IMPLI-
CATIONS OF ORBITAL DEBRIS REMOVAL: COMMENTS OF THE SPACE FRONTIER FOUNDATION
5 (2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/23379988/Legal-and-Economics-Implications
-of-Orbital-Debris-Removal.
121 Registration Convention, supra note 70, art. VI.
122 Nelson, supra note 16, at 407.
123 See Harwood, supra note 85 (“We don’t have an air traffic controller in space. There is
no universal way of knowing what’s coming in your direction.”).
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Even worse, these regulations are not environmentally minded.
There is no liability under the ILD without damage, and “ ‘damage’ means
loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or dam-
age to property.”124 As pointed out by David Tan, the ILD “does not cover
indirect damage or non-physical damage,” which means “it does not deal
with environmental dangers created by space activities.”125 This means
that even if a State was concerned with the environmental impact of or-
bital debris, it would have no recourse through this system.126 Moreover,
this system does not address the removal of debris, only the assigning of
liability, so even if it worked perfectly, it would still not be a solution to
the problem at hand.
3. Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee and the
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space Regulations
A major effort at orbital debris mitigation is the Inter-Agency Space
Debris Coordination Committee (“IADC”), an organization that is made up
of twelve space agencies.127 The scope of the IADC’s goals is “(1) limitation
of debris released during normal operations, (2) minimization of the poten-
tial for on-orbit breakups, (3) post-mission disposal, and (4) prevention of
on-orbit collisions.”128 Meanwhile, the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“UNCOPUOS”) has guidelines modeled after
the IADC’s.129 UNCOPUOS guidelines are “very similar, but are not iden-
tical, to the IADC guidelines,”130 and UNCOPUOS looks to “(1) curtailment
and mitigation of space debris generation for the near term, and (2) long-
term debris mitigation.”131
It is of course a good thing for reducing orbital debris levels that
these two sets of guidelines exist, but their effectiveness should not be over-
stated. The UNCOPUOS guidelines are not binding on states.132 The IADC
guidelines are limited in that they apply only to missions begun after the
124 ILD, supra note 69, art. I.
125 Tan, supra note 119, at 168.
126 See TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 76.
127 For a list of members, see INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMMITTEE,
http://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=home (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
128 ASSESSMENT, supra note 44, at 80.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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guidelines came into effect, but only “if possible” to current operations.133
Also, only space agencies are members, excluding all other government
agencies and private corporations.134 The greatest weakness of these guide-
lines as they relate to reducing orbital debris, however, is that they do not
address the rules for removing currently existing debris.
B. Domestic Efforts at Regulation of Orbital Debris
1. Regulations Affecting Orbital Debris in the United States
There are several domestic regulations in the United States that
address, or at least potentially address, the mitigation of orbital debris.
Since 1969, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) has required
that federal agencies create a report on the potential environmental im-
pact of major federal actions.135 However, “[s]everal United States govern-
ment agencies have determined as a legal matter that activities involving
outer space do not fall under the purview of the Act.”136 NASA has regula-
tions that apply within the United States to any governmental and non-
governmental space activities, and it uses these regulations to enforce the
NEPA policy for any activities which could have a significant environmen-
tal impact on Earth.137 However, “NASA’s environmental regulations do not
appear to apply to activities in the ‘global commons’ of outer space,”138 and
so are only at issue when activities affect the terrestrial environment.
Relating to mitigating orbital debris, NASA is a proponent of the
“25-year rule,” which “seeks to restrict the post-operational life of objects
in space to no more than 25 years.”139 The 25-year rule has been adopted
by some international organizations, such as the European Space Agency
(“ESA”),140 but it is not uniformly followed even within the United States.
The standard is often given waivers within NASA,141 and the rule is not,
in fact, a rule under federal law.142 This means that other federal agencies
do not have to follow the 25-year rule at all.
133 Id.
134 INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMMITTEE, supra note 127.
135 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
136 Irene Atney-Yurdin, Space Debris Legal Research Guide, 3 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 167, 172
(1991).
137 Id. at 173.
138 Id.
139 ASSESSMENT, supra note 44, at 77.
140 Id. at 58.
141 Id. at 77–78.
142 Id. at 77.
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2. The Essential Problem with Domestic Regulations
Of course, other space-using countries have their own national laws
regarding the use of orbit and orbital debris.143 But the domestic efforts
from any one nation, including the United States, cannot be effective in
dealing with an environment that so many nations impact. Space travel
is inherently international,144 as the international community made clear
in response to the Bogotá Eight.145 The Bogotá Eight was a group of eight
South and Central American countries who attempted to claim sovereign
rights over GEO slots directly above their nations.146 These nations released
the Bogotá Declaration of 1976, which asserted that any nation wishing to
place a satellite in one of these GEO slots must get the permission of the
Bogotá Declaration nation over which the slot lay.147 The Outer Space
Legal Subcommittee found “that claims of sovereignty over the [GEO] or
any other part of outer space are incompatible with the express and implied
spirit of the Outer Space Treaty and should be dismissed.”148 International
law has dominated in orbit,149 and the consensus seems to be that it should
continue to do so.
Whether an “orbital slot” is above a particular nation in GEO is in-
determinable because objects in orbit move, collide, and interact with one
another. A nation cannot put an object into space without at least a possi-
bility that it could come into contact with an object from another nation.
Even if one nation is able to limit its creation of orbital debris, that is a
drop in the bucket. In a world where Chinese satellite demolition tests
create massive amounts of debris,150 and where Russian and American
143 For a database of domestic laws from United Nations Member States, see Browse
Legislative Texts, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, http://www.unoosa.org/oosaddb
/browse_all_js.jsp?dims=COUNTRY_CODE (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
144 See, e.g., Beck, supra note 5, at 30. “In an area that is inherently international in nature
as outer space travel, it is unacceptable to expect domestic tort laws to control issues of lia-
bility and regulation over commercial spacecraft.” Id. International space law has tradi-
tionally taken the stance that orbit, and beyond, is not something that can be owned or
controlled by individual nations. “The exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of
all countries.” OST, supra note 68, art. I. “Recognizing the common interest of all mankind
in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.” ILD, supra
note 69, Preamble (emphasis in original).
145 See Nayebi, supra note 14, at 489.
146 Id. at 488.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 489.
149 Id. at 471–72.
150 BAIOCCHI & WELSER, supra note 32, at 2.
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satellites collide,151 no nation can eliminate the problem of orbital debris
on its own.
III. A PEPAT-BASED TREATY FOR REGULATING ORBIT
In looking for a new way to regulate and protect the unique envi-
ronment of Earth orbit, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. The broad
outlines of a viable alternative can be found in PEPAT, which has success-
fully organized the international community around a set of standards for
protecting a massive, environmentally threatened area.152
A. Similarities Between Orbit and Antarctica
The environmental policy concerns surrounding Earth’s orbit are
similar to those surrounding the Antarctic. Both are large regions that have
a connection to the well-being of other parts of Earth’s environment, both
experience competing claims from different nations, and both have gov-
ernmental and non-governmental groups with economic or political in-
vestments.153 Space law was defined by the Cold War, later international
tension, and disagreement over a massive area to which many countries
believe they have a right.154 This is much like the diplomatic situation that
created the Antarctic Treaty, the underlying structure of PEPAT.155
151 Pusey, supra note 2, at 430.
152 For a recent overview of the effectiveness of PEPAT, see R. ROURA ET AL., ANTARCTIC
TREATY CONSULTATIVE MEETING, THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENTAL PROTOCOL, 1991–2011
(2011), available at http://asoc.org/storage/documents/Meetings/ATCM/XXXIV/The_Antarctic
_Environmental_Protocol_1991-2011.pdf (explaining that although PEPAT has not had
perfect results, the treaty is vast in scope and has only been in effect for fourteen years).
The finding of the committee was that, “[o]n the whole, inspections reported progress in
many aspects of implementing the Protocol since 1998—such as waste management—but
it is apparent that some aspects are taking a long time to be implemented.” Id. at 4. One
of the primary goals of PEPAT was to block proposals from New Zealand that mining be al-
lowed in Antarctica, and it is a positive sign of the effectiveness of this system that PEPAT’s
ban on mining is still respected. Mark Horstman, Call to Strengthen Antarctic Mining Ban,
ABC SCI. (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.abc.net.au/science/articles/2011/10/04/3332124.htm.
153 Margaret S. Race, Policies for Scientific Exploration and Environmental Protection:
Comparison of the Antarctic and Outer Space Treaties, in SCIENCE DIPLOMACY: ANTARCTICA,
SCIENCE AND THE GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SPACES 143, 144 (Paul A. Berkman et
al. eds., 2011).
154 See id.
155 Donald Rothwell, The Antarctic Treaty: 1961–1991 and Beyond, 14 SIDNEY L. REV. 62, 62
(1992) (“By the late 1940s sovereignty claims in Antarctica had been asserted by Argentina,
Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom. . . . With the two
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B. Brief Outline of PEPAT
PEPAT exists under the overarching Antarctic Treaty System
(“ATS”).156 This system came into being with the Antarctic Treaty, which
was ratified in June of 1961.157 The countries which initially ratified ATS
were the twelve that were “then active in Antarctic science.”158 There are
currently forty-six nations under the Antarctic Treaty, which accounts for
approximately eighty percent of the world’s population.159 These countries
meet annually to decide the rules that govern the Antarctic, and have cre-
ated three currently used international agreements, including PEPAT.160
PEPAT was largely the result of the efforts of Australia, France,
Italy, and Belgium to create an international agreement that would pro-
vide environmental protection in Antarctica.161 Although PEPAT was
agreed to in 1991, it did not come into effect until 1998,162 a subject which
will be returned to in Part III.E.2.
Unlike the regulations on space, as one commentator noted before
the treaty was ratified, “PEPAT is a legally binding instrument: once it
enters into force there are no more uncertainties about its legal status.”163
PEPAT’s basic goal, as outlined in the treaty, is that “activities in the
Antarctic Treaty area shall be planned and conducted so as to limit ad-
verse impacts on the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated
ecosystems.”164 In furtherance of this goal, PEPAT requires that parties
major Cold War protagonists, the United States and Soviet Union, having substantial histor-
ical and scientific interests in Antarctica . . . there was a growing fear that Antarctic sover-
eignty and the strategic and scientific importance of the continent could result in a conflict
which would result in the world’s greatest natural laboratory being permanently damaged.”).
156 The Antarctic Treaty—Background Information, NATURAL ENV’T RESEARCH COUNCIL,
http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/about_antarctica/geopolitical/treaty/index.php (last visited
Jan. 29, 2013).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. The other two agreements are the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic
Seals (1972) and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(1980). Id.
161 Australian Antarctic Div., The Treaty: An Historical Outline, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, http://
www.antarctica.gov.au/antarctic-law-and-treaty/our-treaty-obligations/history (last visited
Jan. 29, 2013).
162 Id.
163 Laura Pineschi, The Madrid Protocol on the Protection of the Antarctic Environment and
its Effectiveness, in INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ANTARCTICA 263 (Francesco Francioni & Tullio
Scovazzi eds., 1996).
164 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, art. 3(2)(a), Oct. 4, 1991,
30 I.L.M. 1455 [hereinafter PEPAT].
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to the treaty conduct environmental impact studies.165 This requirement
applies to governmental and non-governmental activities.166
C. PEPAT’s Structure and Effective Regulation of Orbit
1. Different Parties at Different Levels
Although PEPAT only officially recognizes States as parties, it does
acknowledge the activities of nations and private parties,167 which is an
important consideration for orbit. Current international regulations are
largely focused on nation states, rather than private corporations,168 despite
the fact that private corporate action in space is a growing issue.169 PEPAT
organizes parties to the treaty on two levels: there are Consultative Parties
and there are Observers.170 While all parties participate in discussions and
attend meetings, only the Consultative Parties vote on passing regula-
tions.171 Consultative Parties are those who have sufficient involvement
in Antarctica.172 This is yet another situation in which Antarctica is like
orbit—it is a region which every nation on Earth has a relevant interest in,
yet only a handful of countries and private parties actually have a physical
presence there. Should a dispute arise between any two parties, there are
dispute settlement procedures, which are further discussed in Part III.C.2.
These PEPAT provisions would be a useful tool to import into an
orbital environmental protocol. Parties actively sending objects into orbit
would be Consultative Parties, who could make decisions to amend the pro-
tocol, while any other party who wishes to sign on would be an Observer
and unable to amend the protocol unless their status were changed. This
would solve the current problem plaguing attempts to regulate space—
which is that true international consensus on controversial environmental
issues is next to impossible if every single country has equal say. This is
part of the reason UNCOPUOS efforts to effectively regulate orbit through
the treaties previously discussed have failed; it requires consensus from all
165 Id. art. 8.
166 Id. art. 8(2).
167 Id. arts. 3(2), 15(1)(a).
168 See, e.g., OST, supra note 68, art. VI (“States Parties to the Treaty shall bear inter-
national responsibility for national activities in outer space . . . whether such activities
are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities.”).
169 Beck, supra note 5, at 1.
170 Sattler, supra note 90, at 32.
171 Id.
172 Id.
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participating nations to address the problem of orbital debris.173 The ATS,
on the other hand, “has successfully squelched potential territorial disputes,
ensured the peaceful use of the area, encouraged the proliferation of scien-
tific research, and made strides in protecting the fragile environment.”174
By following the PEPAT example and breaking away from the ex-
treme view in which all nations get equal say in how space is used, whether
or not they are using it,175 the international community can become an ef-
fective, active decision-making body in how it regulates orbit. Overhauling
the rules for orbit to enforce reducing the creation of orbital debris and lay-
ing the groundwork for removing orbital debris will be a feasible project if
the body attempting this project has input from all interested nations, but
vests its power in those who are actually putting things into orbit.
2. Settlement of Disputes
Unlike current regulations, PEPAT requires mandatory dispute
settlement.176 PEPAT allows parties to choose the International Court of
Justice (“ICJ”) by consensus, with an alternative Arbitral Tribunal as the
default choice.177 Such flexibility is essential for dealing with parties that
do not always recognize the ICJ, like the United States.178 The Outer Space
Treaty only asks for “international cooperation and consultation,”179 and
the Liability Convention’s only addition to this is that if the parties involved
do not have diplomatic channels, the dispute may be presented to the U.N.
Secretary General or third party states.180 Without enforcement, environ-
mental impact studies are useless.181
173 Balsamello, supra note 88, at 1786–87.
174 Lynn M. Fountain, Creating Momentum in Space: Ending the Paralysis Produced by the
“Common Heritage of Mankind” Doctrine, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1753, 1771 (2003).
175 OST, supra note 68, art. I.
176 PEPAT, supra note 164, art. 18.
177 Id. art. 19.
178 Sean Murphy, The United States and the International Court of Justice: Coping with
Antinomies, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES: THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 46, 46 (Cesare Romano ed., 2009) (“[T]he United States has never
been willing to submit itself to the plenary authority of the [International Court of
Justice], and has typically reacted negatively to decisions by the Court that are adverse
to U.S. interests. . . . [The U.S.] withdrew from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1986,
and recently terminated its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction.”).
179 Balsamello, supra note 88, at 1787.
180 Id. at 1788.
181 See TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 91 (“In order for an environmental impact analysis to have
any meaning, there must be an enforcement mechanism, otherwise it is self-policing and
will be ineffective.”).
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Moreover, neither the OST nor the ILD properly addresses how to
punish a violating party for environmental damage that does not directly
harm a particular party. The arbitration system of PEPAT, however, ad-
dresses these concerns. Having a real regulatory system would give in-
ternational space law some teeth, and create a system which can enforce
its regulations.182
D. Aspects of PEPAT That Will Translate Well to Orbit
The stated concerns of PEPAT have equivalents for orbit. The
focuses of PEPAT are essentially the same as the needed focus in orbit.
For instance, PEPAT is concerned with intrinsic natural beauty183 and sci-
entific research,184 which can both be translated into the issues of astro-
nomical blinding and scientific research in orbit.
1. The PEPAT Model and Orbital Debris
a. Tracking and Identifying Debris for Removal
Provisions requiring parties to take charge of waste, like the one
contained in PEPAT,185 would dovetail well with existing programs to track
debris. The waste provision could be adapted to require parties to “claim”
all waste, and any unclaimed debris would then be removable by any
nation. This would circumvent the Liability Convention, which implies that
debris may not be removed unless the party who “owns” it has consented.186
PEPAT requires parties to clean up all waste from activities in
Antarctica.187 This is a rule that could be directly translated to activities
in orbit, once the technology for removing such debris is sufficiently de-
veloped. Merely mitigating the creation of debris is not enough; orbital
debris must someday be actively removed.188 While the technology does
not currently exist to remove orbital debris,189 a PEPAT-based treaty could
be designed so that when this technology is developed, the treaty will work
182 DUNSTAN & WERB, supra note 120, at 5 (explaining that many states do not routinely
follow the Registration Convention).
183 PEPAT, supra note 164, art. 3(1).
184 Id.
185 Id. Annex III.
186 OST, supra note 68, art. VIII.
187 PEPAT, supra note 164, Annex III.
188 See supra Part I.B.2.
189 TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 79–80.
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as a legal framework for the effort to remove the debris, rather than being
a roadblock like current international space law.190
b. Mitigating Debris Creation
Under PEPAT, all parties must create environmental impact assess-
ments before engaging in major activities in Antarctica.191 Those studies
are then inspected by members of PEPAT and the organizing body, which
determine the appropriateness of the action.192 For a PEPAT-based treaty,
environmental impact studies would require parties to determine the
potential harm of launching a space object, including potential debris cre-
ation and the plan for retiring the satellite from orbit at the end of its oper-
ating lifetime.
PEPAT members have the right to inspect one another’s facilities.193
For the new protocol, this would involve both inspections of launch sites
and materials, and the use of existing debris tracking systems. Under
PEPAT, nations regularly make use of their right of inspection, so if sim-
ilar powers and attitudes are enforced in relation to activities in orbit, the
international community would become self-policing.194 In conjunction with
dispute settlement procedures,195 this would solve one of the major prob-
lems with the current system of space treaties: the lack of enforcement
mechanisms.196 Rather than merely requesting states to register objects
or trying to deal with the later liability problems, a PEPAT-based treaty
would work from the beginning of orbital projects, with states monitoring
one another from the outset with the power to challenge any party that
does not comply with the treaty.
c. Liability for Environmental Damage
The current orbital regulations regarding liability are woefully
inadequate because they established a standard of fault-based liability
190 Supra Part II.A.1.a (discussing how the OST is a roadblock to removing orbital debris).
191 PEPAT, supra note 164, art. 8.
192 Id. Annex I, art. 3.
193 Australian Antarctic Div., Inspections Under the Antarctic Treaty and Its Protocol on
Environmental Protection, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, http://www.antarctica.gov.au/antarctic-law
-and-treaty/treaty-inspections (last modified July 14, 2005).
194 See id. Since 1963, Australia has used its rights for inspection eight times, with two of
those inspections occurring within the past few years. Id.
195 See supra Part III.C.2.
196 See Pusey, supra note 2, at 434.
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that does not take into account environmental damage.197 Under the pro-
posed system, the rules for liability could follow PEPAT’s environmentally
minded, practical structure. As under PEPAT, there could be three layers
of responsibility in avoiding environmental damage liability: the duty to
take preventative measures to avoid environmental damage, the duty to es-
tablish a contingency plan should environmentally adverse incidents occur,
and the duty to take response action to environmental emergencies.198 Fur-
ther, as in PEPAT, liability would exist for environmental damage, and
the liability would be strict, with multiple parties held jointly and severally
liable.199 This system would require measures for preventing environ-
mental damage in the first place. Furthermore, should environmental dam-
age occur, it would establish a system for dealing with it, both in a physical
sense (as technology improves, removing orbital debris) and in an economic
sense. These rules would make the economic risk of environmental damage
a true impetus for actors in space to pursue environmentally sound policy.
2. PEPAT and Tourism
One booming industry in Antarctica is tourism,200 and this is also
an emerging issue in space.201 There are now private companies launch-
ing reusable manned spacecraft,202 and as technology improves, the possi-
bilities for space tourism will only increase. As Brian Beck said after noting
that existing regulations of orbit do not in any way regulate tourism, “[t]he
treaty regime cannot accommodate a booming private space flight industry,
the emerging space tourism market.”203
For Antarctica, PEPAT has strictly limited commercial development
in some areas (e.g., mining), while continuing to allow it in others (such as
197 See supra Part II.A.2.a.
198 PEPAT, supra note 164, Annex VI, arts. 3–5.
199 Id. Annex VI, art. 6.
200 Human Impacts on Antarctica and Threats to the Environment—Tourism, COOL
ANTARCTICA, http://www.coolantarctica.com/Antarctica%20fact%20file/science/threats
_tourism.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
201 John Adolph, The Recent Boom in Private Space Development and the Necessity of an
International Framework Embracing Private Property Rights to Encourage Investment,
40 INT’L LAW. 961, 962 (2006) (“Until recently, the idea of private citizens in space existed
only in the imaginations of science fiction writers. Today, entrepreneurs form companies
and organizations to develop space business opportunities ranging from satellite deploy-
ment to tourism to space mining.”).
202 Id. at 975.
203 Beck, supra note 5, at 4.
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tourism).204 The treaty has attempted to regulate how commercial develop-
ment progresses, as well as international attitudes towards the develop-
ment of the Antarctic. This must be done in orbit as well. The new orbital
regulations should look to how PEPAT directly addresses tourism, unlike
any of the current space regulations. As in PEPAT, the tourism industry
could be included as something that parties must submit environmental im-
pact reports on.205 The proposed system will also include private companies
as parties.206 Therefore, environmental protocols dealing with tourism will
be more effective under the proposed system, since this system will directly
address private tourism companies.
E. Significantly Amending Some Aspects of PEPAT for Orbit
1. Articles That Strictly Ban Activities
Some articles from PEPAT need to be substantially altered to bet-
ter fit the environment in question, or left out altogether. The Antarctic
is home to a complex ecosystem of plants and animals, but the only living
creatures in orbit are the ones that we put up there. All parts of the PEPAT
regulations that deal with flora, fauna, mining and the ocean are inappli-
cable, or should be significantly altered.
For instance, under PEPAT, zones within Antarctica can be “desig-
nated as an Antarctic Specially Protected Area or an Antarctic Specially
Managed Area. Activities in those Areas shall be prohibited, restricted or
managed in accordance with Management Plans.”207 Specially Protected
Areas (“SPAs”) under PEPAT are normally given more protections, as they
are often the “only known habitat of any species”208 or “examples of out-
standing geological, glaciological or geomorphological features,”209 or other
such zones which are especially valuable or delicate. Orbit is less fragile
than the Antarctic, because it has no wildlife. Orbital protocol should there-
fore be less strict and friendlier to commercial interests, like telecommu-
nications, and therefore the idea of SPAs should be inversed for orbit.
SPAs under the proposed treaty would essentially be a photo nega-
tive of those in PEPAT. The most immediate concern for modern nations
204 PEPAT, supra note 164, art. 7; id. Annex III, art. 1.
205 Id. art. 3(4).
206 See infra Part III.E.2.
207 Id. Annex V, art. 2.
208 Id. art. 3(2)(d).
209 Id. art. 3(2)(f).
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is the highly in-demand zone that is GEO. This part of orbit could be a
kind of SPA under the proposed system. Rather than having smaller zones
with more restrictions as in PEPAT, GEO would be a smaller zone within
the given area with fewer restrictions. The heavy use of GEO is the only
way to support modern telecommunications, and so environmental concerns
will need to be a bit more relaxed for modern society to function and for
states and private companies to willingly sign on to the treaty. The debris
mitigation standards of the ITU may even be used by the new treaty for
GEO only.210
2. Structural and Enforcement Concerns
It took PEPAT seven years from when it was first written to actu-
ally come into force, and the nations that signed on earlier had no obliga-
tions under PEPAT until it was ratified.211 Orbital debris is an increasing
environmental danger,212 and action should be taken sooner, rather than
later, to avoid another incident like China’s disastrous attempt to “retire”
a satellite.213 Therefore, while PEPAT allowed for provisional application
by signing members before it was ratified,214 this orbital environmental
protocol could require signatories to independently implement the protocol
to the extent feasible until its entry into force. This would promote envi-
ronmental action even while the regulations were being set up. Such a sys-
tem would be a double-edged sword, however. The upside is that it might
help to improve the mitigation of the creation of orbital debris as soon as
possible. The downside is that mandatory enforcement from the signing
date could scare off parties who might otherwise be willing to sign on.215
210 See Nayebi, supra note 14, at 4–5.
211 R. ROURA ET AL., supra note 152, at 3.
212 See supra Part I.B.1.
213 Supra Part I.B.2.
214 Pineschi, supra note 163, at 265–66.
215 There will be a number of practical concerns related to creating a new international
system for this proposed treaty. Although the practical political maneuvering that will be
necessary is beyond the scope of this note, that it is possible can be seen by the fact that such
things have been done in the past. The ATS offers an example of a large, international
treaty regime developed to regulate an area under competing territorial claims. Barbara
Heim, Exploring the Last Frontiers for Mineral Resources: A Comparison of International
Law Regarding the Deep Seabed, Outer Space and Antarctica, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
819, 839 (1990). PEPAT itself, while not a free-standing system, shows that environmentally
focused, international protocols can be created in the modern world. R. ROURA ET AL., supra
note 152, at 3.
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There are three major structural differences between PEPAT and
an ideal treaty regulating orbit. One issue is that PEPAT exists as a subset
of a larger treaty system, the ATS, and the proposed orbit treaty would be
free standing. This means that the proposed treaty would have to be more
extensive than PEPAT, because it would be establishing the protocol not
just for reporting to some greater treaty body, but for running its own
internal system for oversight, meetings, amending the protocol, etc.
Another structural concern is that the Committee for Environmen-
tal Protection (“CEP”) for PEPAT is purely advisory.216 CEP is designed to
advise parties on their environmental protection measures on issues such
as “the effectiveness of measures taken pursuant to this Protocol”217 and
“the need to update, strengthen or otherwise improve such measures.”218
This advisory function would still be part of the role of the proposed com-
mittee, but not the only role. As a free-standing treaty, a similar committee
for orbit could have a more active power to control how debris is removed
from orbit and how members mitigate debris creation.
While less state-centric than the extant orbital regulations, PEPAT
is still generally aimed at nations, not private companies. PEPAT is en-
forced against non-governmental activities,219 but it still discusses “State”
actors.220 The proposed treaty should allow for private companies to sign
on as parties to the treaty, bound to its regulations in the same way that
state parties would be. This would ensure that companies involved in space
travel do not get away with activities that nations could not, particularly
companies that are internationally based, and therefore difficult to regu-
late through the actions of any single state.
Current orbital regulations are lacking two important things: envi-
ronmental focus and teeth. A free standing system which is modeled on the
effective and environmentally sound aspects of PEPAT, while taking a
stronger stance on certain issues, such as holding private corporations
environmentally accountable, is a solution to both of these problems.
CONCLUSION
Space is big, so big that it is hard to comprehend. But there was
a point in human history when Earth seemed just as huge and infinite.
216 PEPAT, supra note 164, art. 12.
217 Id. art. 12(a).
218 Id. art. 12(b).
219 Id. art. 15(a).
220 Id. art. 21.
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Before modern communication networks and transportation, for an aver-
age person, a nation on the other side of the world may as well have been
on another planet. Now we travel, trade, and communicate with people the
world over, and we have become aware of Earth as an interconnected envi-
ronmental system.221 Earth has shrunk as human perception has grown,
and that expanding perception must take into account the space directly
surrounding our planet. Earth’s orbit is part of its environment, a part that
has become terribly polluted.222 The international community needs to shift
its focus in regulating orbit to take environmental concerns into account.
A new protocol is needed, and PEPAT offers a well-suited model for a new
regulatory system. By investing the international community’s efforts on
creating a new, PEPAT-based system, the disaster of orbital debris can be
confronted, mitigated, and, as technology improves, cleaned up.
221 Alan Sitkin & Nick Bowen, International Business—Extension Material, in INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS: CHALLENGES AND CHOICES, available at http://www.oup.com/uk/orc
/bin/9780199533916/01student/exmaterial/page_74.htm.
222 Amos, supra note 24.
